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Zoonoses and Public Health

ORIGINAL ARTICLE
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Impacts

• Human-to-human transmission of rabies is thought to be a rare event.
•
•

However, because rabies is invariably fatal once symptoms occur, public
health investigations of human rabies cases are necessary to prevent further
cases of this high-consequence disease.
Delays in the diagnosis of rabies can obfuscate the recognition of an
exposure, often resulting in more conservative treatment recommendations
and increased use of rabies biologics.
Good working inter-agency relationships across local, state, and federal
lines are critical for the effective protection of public health in large,
complex investigations.
Summary
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This article describes and contrasts the public health response to two human
rabies cases: one organ recipient diagnosed within days of symptom onset and
the transplant donor who was diagnosed 18 months post-symptom onset. In
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Rabies Acquired through Organ Transplantation

response to an organ-transplant-related rabies case diagnosed in 2013, organ
donor and recipient investigations were conducted by multiple public health
agencies. Persons with potential exposure to infectious patient materials were
assessed for rabies virus exposure. An exposure investigation was conducted to
determine the source of the organ donor’s infection. Over 100 persons from more
than 20 agencies spent over 2700 h conducting contact investigations in healthcare, military and community settings. The 564 persons assessed include 417
healthcare workers [5.8% recommended for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP)],
96 community contacts (15.6% recommended for PEP), 30 autopsy personnel
(50% recommended for PEP), and 21 other persons (4.8% recommended for
PEP). Donor contacts represented 188 assessed with 20.2% recommended for
PEP, compared with 5.6% of 306 recipient contacts recommended for PEP.
Human rabies cases result in substantial use of public health and medical
resources, especially when diagnosis is delayed. Although rare, clinicians should
consider rabies in cases of encephalitis of unexplained aetiology, particularly for
cases that may result in organ donation.

doi: 10.1111/zph.12105

Introduction
Rabies is a neurotropic virus with the highest mortality rate
of known infectious diseases (Rupprecht and Peterson,
2011). Globally, more than 55 000 persons die of rabies
annually; however, human rabies is rare in the United
States (Rupprecht and Peterson, 2011; Blanton et al.,
2012). When a human rabies case is identified in the US,
public health investigations must be conducted to identify
persons who had contact with the patient, to provide
appropriate recommendations for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) and prevent disease (Manning et al., 2008).
Most rabies infections are acquired from the bite of an
infected animal; however, tissue and organs from patients
who died of undiagnosed rabies have resulted in death several weeks after transplantation (Srinivasan et al., 2005;
Bronnert et al., 2007). While organ and tissue transplantation is the only mechanism of human-to-human transmission that has been laboratory confirmed, it is theoretically
possible for human-to-human transmission to occur if
mucous membranes or non-intact skin come in contact with
the saliva, neural tissue, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) or tears
from a person infected with rabies (Fekadu et al., 1996;
Manning et al., 2008). Symptoms typically develop 3–
12 weeks after infection, although longer incubation periods
of over 1 year have been noted. PEP is not effective after
symptom onset and must be initiated as soon after exposure
as possible (Manning et al., 2008; Rupprecht and Peterson,
2011). Thus, all persons potentially exposed to a patient with
rabies need to be rapidly identified and assessed.
In February 2013, a Maryland resident was diagnosed
with rabies following a 4-week clinical illness that presented
as hip pain and progressed to weakness, ataxia and rapid
neurologic decline (Vora et al., 2013). No animal exposures

were identified. The patient had received a kidney transplant 17 months prior to symptom onset, a potential incubation period much longer than the 6 weeks previously
reported for transplant-associated rabies infections (Srinivasan et al., 2005; Bronnert et al., 2007). However, the possibility of transplant-acquired infection was considered,
and organ donor tissue stored since 2011 was obtained for
testing. Within 5 days of the recipient’s diagnosis, rabies
antigen was identified in archived brain tissue from the kidney donor. Genetic sequences were identical to virus from
the recipient, confirming kidney transplantation as the
source of infection. The genetic sequence was closely associated with a raccoon variant circulating in North Carolina,
the donor’s state of residence. The donor’s heart, liver and
second kidney had been transplanted into three other recipients. Given the high consequences of rabies infection, the
long incubation period observed in the kidney recipient
and the limited data regarding raccoon rabies pathogenesis
in humans, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) recommended contact investigations be conducted
for persons with exposures to the organ donor and donor
tissues and the deceased kidney recipient (Centers for Disease C, Prevention, 2003; Affairs UDoV, 2012).
We describe a well-coordinated, intensive multiagency
effort to perform these contact investigations among the
numerous healthcare workers, family and community
members potentially exposed to rabies virus.
Methods
Investigation coordination and communications
An incident command-like structure was implemented at
the CDC whereby individuals were assigned specific roles.
This structure allowed the coordination of multiple rabies
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exposure investigations between local, state and federal
public health agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD),
an organ procurement organization, and clinical entities.
Coordination was achieved through multiple daily conference calls in which topics such as risk assessment, PEP recommendations and updates regarding the progress of the
investigation were discussed. State health departments
managed in-state investigational activities in coordination
with local health officials. Because both the organ donor
and recipient received some of their care at military medical facilities, the DoD facilitated military hospital contact
investigations. CDC provided overall coordination, situational awareness, risk assessment and PEP guidance, and
educational materials.
Exposure investigation – organ donor
Representatives from the state health department of the
donor’s state of residence and from the DoD notified the
family of the organ donor’s post-humous diagnosis of
rabies. Family and friends were interviewed to assess the
organ donor’s potential rabies exposures in the 5 years
prior to death and to determine his travel history to facilitate contact investigations during the potential infectious
period.
Contact investigations – organ donor, deceased organ
recipient and asymptomatic recipients
Contact investigations were conducted using standardized
questionnaires that assessed mucous membrane or broken
skin exposure to infected saliva, neural tissue, CSF or
tears. The risk assessment tools were adapted to assess
unique exposures that might exist within certain risk
groups. For example, healthcare workers were additionally
queried about high-risk procedures (e.g. intubation, tracheal tube maintenance, lumbar puncture, nasogastric
tube insertion, and other procedures involving the oral
cavity) and the type of personal protective equipment
(PPE) worn. For community contacts, the questionnaire
specifically addressed social activities such as sharing of
food, drink or utensils, intimate contact and other interactions that could result in exposure to infectious materials.
Additional assessment tools were created for special circumstances, including for morticians, laboratory and
autopsy personnel, and airline passengers in adjacent seats
(Centers for Disease C, Prevention, 2010a, 2012a). The
infectious period was determined to be the 14 days prior
to symptom onset until death and decontamination of
infectious materials. This infectious period was based on
studies which have shown viral shedding up to 10 days
prior to symptom onset in dogs, cats and ferrets (Tepsumethanon et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2011). The asymp562
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tomatic shedding period has not been established in other
species, and therefore, a more conservative period of
14 days was applied.
Healthcare workers involved in the medical care of the
two patients with rabies were identified through review of
medical records and interviews. Community contacts were
identified through interviews with family members, community leaders, military instructors and classmates. Social
media, including Google searches and Facebook, was used
to help identify contacts and to determine the dates of
social gatherings, commercial flights and other important
events that occurred during the infectious period.
Healthcare facilities involved in the patients’ care
assumed primary responsibility for conducting risk assessments of potentially exposed hospital staff. State, local and
DoD public health personnel conducted risk assessments of
community contacts and other non-hospital employees.
Public health departments assisted healthcare facilities with
recommendations for PEP based on the results of risk
assessments. The organ procurement organization provided
information on all organs that were procured as well as
contact information for the recipients. Medical facilities
involved in the transplantation procedures worked with
CDC and state health departments to notify recipients of
the rabies exposure, oversee administration of PEP and
obtain samples for serologic follow-up. Each group
involved in conducting risk assessments provided an
estimation of time spent on contact tracing and risk
assessment activities.
In cases of animal bite transmission of rabies, urine has
not been shown to harbour infectious virus. However, in a
2004 transplant-associated rabies case, a kidney recipient
was found to have rabies antigen present throughout the
kidney. This prompted concern for the possibility of shedding live virus in urine, and in that investigation, CDC
issued expanded criteria for risk assessments in which
urine, under certain conditions, was considered infectious
(Baer, 1975; Centers for Disease C, Prevention, 2004a). In
this current investigation, renal tissue from the donor and
both kidney recipients was tested for rabies virus and guidance regarding the potential infectiousness of urine and
renal tissue was developed based on these results.
Results
Investigation coordination and communications
Daily conference calls with local, state and federal partners
ensured coordination and expedited contact tracing, problem solving and confirmation of information obtained
through multiple sources. Regular conference call coordination was more efficient than communicating via
confidential faxes and was not subject to public access
requirements applicable in some states, which could poten-
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tially violate the confidentiality of personal health information. For the intrastate responses, the responsible state
health departments also coordinated detailed, real-time
assessments through daily calls with involved partners,
including local health departments and clinical facilities.
Press releases were coordinated among local, state and federal partners using electronic mail and conference calls to
ensure unified messaging to the public.
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raccoons: a bite on the right hand in February 2010 and a
bite on an unspecified hand in January 2011 (Fig. 1). The
second raccoon was reportedly healthy up to 4 weeks
post-bite. The donor did not seek medical attention for
either of his reported bite wounds. Neither raccoon
was available for testing at the time of the exposure
investigation.

Exposure investigation – organ donor

Contact investigation – organ donor, infectious period
August to September, 2011

The organ donor was an avid hunter and trapper with
extensive exposures to wildlife. Family and friends
reported two instances in which the donor was bitten by

The organ donor investigation was initiated 18 months
after symptom onset (Fig. 2). Reported donor symptom
onset began with bilateral hand paresthesias and nausea in

Fig. 1. Timeline of organ donation, organ transplantation and rabies diagnosis.

Fig. 2. Timeline of organ recipient’s infectious period, rabies diagnosis and subsequent public health investigation.
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August, 2011, which, at the time, was attributed to a jellyfish sting and consumption of raw fish during the prior
day’s fishing trip. On day one of his infectious period, the
donor flew to Florida on two commercial flights, during
which time he was seated next to one passenger. The passenger was identified through military flight records and
located through the use of social media. Risk assessment
was performed, and no PEP was recommended. The donor
remained on a Florida military base for days 2–18. Sixteen
service members were identified who had interactions with
the donor during this period. The service members were
identified by reviewing the military death investigation
report, a routine investigation conducted after any active
duty military death. All 16 service men were contacted;
three were recommended for PEP.
During days 16–20 of his infectious period, the donor
sought care at a single military clinic four times and a military emergency department once. Fifty-two healthcare
workers at the military medical facilities received risk
assessments, and 14 were recommended for PEP. Four
emergency medical services (EMS) personnel from two different services were involved in the donor’s transport; none
were recommended for PEP. On day 20, the patient was
transferred to a civilian hospital, where his condition deteriorated. He was declared brain dead, and organs were
recovered on day 35 post-onset. During hospitalization at
civilian facilities, 69 healthcare workers and 10 community
contacts were potentially exposed. Two healthcare workers
and three community contacts were recommended for
PEP.
Twenty-five people were present for the donor autopsy,
during which an oscillating saw was used to expose the
brain and neural tissues were potentially aerosolized. Fifteen of those involved in the autopsy were recommended
for PEP due to potential exposure to neural tissue or saliva.
The donor’s body was sent to a funeral home where two
morticians prepared the body for burial; one reported not
routinely using appropriate PPE and was recommended for
PEP.
An organ procurement organization was involved in
procuring the donor’s organs and matching them with
prospective recipients. Prior to transplantation, a questionnaire was administered to the organ donor’s family to
identify potential infectious disease risks. The questionnaire addressed rabies risk by inquiring about animal bite
events occurring in the 6 months prior to illness. Both
bite events reported by the family occurred more than
6 months prior to illness, and therefore, this question did
not capture those potential rabies exposures. The only disease that would definitively render a potential organ donor
ineligible is HIV infection. There is no current regulation
to exclude a donor with unexplained encephalitis or
mental status changes.
564
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Contact investigation – deceased organ recipient –
infectious period January to February, 2013
The deceased kidney recipient’s onset of symptoms began
in late January 2013 with hip pain (Fig. 1). The patient
presented to emergency departments at two different facilities on days 15 and 17 of his infectious period. On day
19, the patient returned to the emergency department at
the first facility and was admitted. The patient remained
hospitalized at that facility until death on day 41. Within
2 h of the recipient’s definitive diagnosis, 8 days after
death, a rabies risk screening clinic was set up at the facility where the patient was hospitalized. A total of 236 risk
assessments were conducted for healthcare workers,
pathologists and laboratorians affiliated with the two
medical facilities in which the recipient received care
(Table 1). Eight were recommended for PEP following
reported broken skin or mucous membrane contact with
saliva or tears during examination, intubation, or while
cleaning up intubation trays. Twenty-one surgical team
members, ward and intensive care unit staff involved in
the kidney transplant in 2011 were assessed; none were
recommended for PEP.
Through interviews with family members and community contacts, 69 individuals were identified as potentially
exposed and received risk assessments. Nine individuals,
primarily family, were recommended to receive PEP
because of known saliva or tear contact with mucous membranes (such as kissing the patient on the lips) or because
saliva contact could not be ruled out.
Rabies virus was not detected in pre- and post-mortem
kidney or urine from the deceased kidney recipient nor
from the asymptomatic kidney recipient; thus, CDC recommended that urine did not present a risk of transmission. Tissue antigen results and accompanying guidance
were not available until 19 days after initial recipient
diagnosis. In the interim, 113 healthcare personnel were
preliminarily evaluated for possible urine exposure; 94
healthcare workers, most (79%) of whom worked in
nursing, reported possible contact with the patient’s urine
or renal tissue. One nurse, who reported high-risk exposure to urine, was already getting PEP based on earlier
assessments. Solid tissue containing nerves, such as renal
tissue from post-transplant biopsies, was considered infectious, consistent with published recommendations (Manning et al., 2008).
Contact investigation – asymptomatic organ recipients
The organ procurement organization provided contact
information for the three additional recipients who
received the donor’s heart, other kidney and liver. No other
donor tissues, including cornea, were transplanted. Rabies
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PEP was started in the three asymptomatic solid organ
recipients to prevent disease. All were seronegative for
rabies virus neutralizing antibodies at the initiation of PEP.
After completion of the five-dose ACIP-recommended PEP
schedule for immunocompromised persons, all three recipients showed evidence of appropriate serum antibody
response. Fifty-eight hospital personnel involved in the
recipient transplant surgeries were identified; none were
recommended for PEP. Ten people who handled post-surgical biopsy samples were identified; none were
recommended for PEP.
Investigation summary

Table 2. Types of exposure by source of infectious material

Type of exposure
Saliva contact
Tears contact
Saliva and tears contact
Neural tissue contact
Involved in patient care,
unable to recall details
Total PEP

Deceased organ
donor contact
investigation
PEP recommended,
N (%)

Deceased organ
recipient contact
investigation
PEP recommended,
N (%)

6 (15.8)
1 (2.6)
4 (10.5)
15 (39.5)
12 (31.6)

11 (64.7)
1 (5.9)
5 (29.4)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

38 (100)

17 (100)

PEP, post-exposure prophylaxis.

Based on estimates provided by each public health agency
and healthcare facility involved in contact tracing and conducting risk assessments, we conservatively estimate that
over 100 local and state public health officials, clinicians,
CDC and DoD representatives spent over 2700 h conducting contact investigation activities. These activities do not
include time spent on diagnosis by laboratories, communications and outreach efforts, and other activities that were
not directly part of the contact investigations. The rabies
investigation of the deceased organ recipient identified and
completed risk assessments for 269 of 306 (88%) potential
contacts within 6 days of confirmation of the recipient
rabies diagnosis (Fig. 2). All risk assessments were completed within 13 days. The organ donor investigation identified and conducted risk assessments for 165 of 190 (88%)
potential contacts within 10 days of confirmation of rabies
diagnosis. All risk assessments were completed within
19 days.
Upon completion of the contact investigations, data collected from risk assessments and PEP recommendations
were reviewed to characterize the exposures. Healthcare
workers represented 417 (74%) of the 564 persons assessed;
5.8% of healthcare workers were recommended for PEP
(Table 1). Of the 96 community contacts identified, 15.6%
were recommended for PEP. Fifteen of 25 (60%) people
associated with the donor autopsy were recommended for
PEP. In total for all investigations, 58 people were
recommended for PEP.
Of those potentially exposed to the donor or donor tissues in 2011, 41 of 258 (15.9%) were recommended for
PEP, compared with 17 of 306 (5.6%) potentially exposed
in 2013 to the deceased recipient. Of those potentially
exposed in 2011, 11 (5.8%) received PEP outside of recommendations compared with 2 (0.7%) who were exposed in
2013. In total, persons exposed in 2011 were 3-fold more
likely to receive PEP compared with persons exposed in
2013. Of the 41 recommended for PEP, twelve were healthcare workers who reported routinely using appropriate PPE
and who had not filed incident reports during the donor’s
566
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hospitalization, but could not recall details about potential
exposures after such an extended period (Table 2). All who
received PEP in this response tolerated the regimen well,
and no severe adverse events were reported.
Discussion
The public health response involved partnerships and coordinated communications among CDC, DoD, 13 state
health departments, nine local health departments, three
foreign Ministries of Health, five federal and civilian
hospitals, pathologists, morticians, EMS technicians,
laboratorians and a commercial airline. The large and wellcoordinated effort resulted in the rapid assessment of
hundreds of potentially exposed individuals, despite the
challenges that arose as a result of delayed rabies diagnosis
in the donor (Fig. 3). This rapid response was critical to
allay concerns and anxiety and to ensure the timely administration of PEP, particularly for healthcare workers who
accounted for three quarters of the case contacts. The
development of generic and tailored risk assessment templates prior to an exposure event can facilitate a more rapid
public health response.
Despite the overall speed and consistency with which the
response was conducted, there were notable differences
between the contact investigation for the deceased recipient, which began 7 weeks after symptom onset, and that of
the donor, which began 18 months after symptom onset.
The organ donor contact investigation took nearly 50%
longer than the recipient investigation, primarily due to
difficulties in locating persons such a long time after exposure. Military affiliation aided in expedited identification of
contacts due, in part, to the extensive communication network and electronic health record. However, overseas travel
among military service members delayed risk assessment
completion and accounted for those who were not contacted until the third week of the donor investigation.
In addition, given the long delay between exposure and
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Fig. 3. Contact investigation social network diagram.

diagnosis, some contacts had moved to other geographic
locations, complicating contact tracing.
Severe adverse events related to PEP are rare; however,
they are possible (Dobardzic et al., 2007; Mattner et al.,
2007a; Mattner et al., 2007b; Manning et al., 2008; Mahamat et al., 2012). Therefore, unnecessary administration of
PEP during a contact investigation should be avoided.
Organ donor contacts were more likely to seek PEP outside
of recommendations compared with contacts of the
deceased organ recipient. This proportion was also higher
than has been documented in other rabies investigations
(Centers for Disease C, Prevention, 2010b, 2011, 2012b,
2012c, 2012d). Concerns about being able to recall
exposures, which occurred 18 months prior to risk assessment, were cited as an indication for PEP, particularly
among healthcare workers for whom PEP was recommended. As a result of these more conservative PEP recom-

mendations based on potential but unconfirmed exposures,
persons identified as contacts of the organ donor were
more likely to be recommended for PEP. Other rabies
investigations have also reported higher PEP recommendation rates when risk assessments were delayed (Centers for
Disease C, Prevention, 2012a).We are not aware of any
severe adverse events in those who received PEP during this
response. However, with increased PEP administration, the
potential for adverse events rises; therefore, timely risk
assessments should be conducted to ensure proper administration of PEP. It is also important to note that in
instances where exposures occurred well in the past and
more people are likely to receive PEP, regionally available
supplies of rabies biologics could be strained.
Mass media have been used in past rabies investigations
following exposures to rabid animals (Centers for Disease
C, Prevention, 1995, 1999), although it was not required to
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identify potential contacts in this investigation. Social
media, however, did play an invaluable role in identifying
and contacting contacts. While the utility of rapidly evolving technologies such as social media for public health purposes must be acknowledged, it is imperative that
investigators who use social media for public health purposes stay mindful of maintaining protections for patient
privacy and confidentiality (Eysenbach, 2009).
Community contacts were far more likely to report an
exposure that warranted PEP than healthcare workers. This
may be because family members are more likely to engage
in intimate behaviours, such as kissing, that could result in
saliva contact (Munoz et al., 2002; Siegel et al., 2007). Standard precautions are recommended to prevent transmission
of rabies in the healthcare setting and include hand hygiene,
use of gloves, gown, mask, eye protection, or face shield,
depending on the anticipated exposure, and safe injection
practices (Siegel et al., 2007). The appropriate use of PPE,
good infection prevention practices, and technologies such
as closed suctioning systems that reduce healthcare provider contact with patient secretions in the healthcare setting undoubtedly contributed to the fewer number of
recommendations for PEP in the healthcare community.
Many trainees were present for the donor’s autopsy as part
of routine forensic training, which resulted in more exposures than a typical autopsy. Persons involved in autopsies
can be exposed to a multitude of infectious agents and must
take care to prevent exposure, especially when the cause of
death is unknown. Autopsy examinations were conducted
using standard biosafety level two precautions to protect
against commonly encountered pathogens (Nolte et al.,
2002). Proper PPE, including use of N95 respirators and face
protection, has been reported to offer sufficient protection
for aerosolized brain matter, as may have occurred when the
oscillating saw was used during the donor’s autopsy (Centers
for Disease C, Prevention, 2010a). The universal use of N95
masks in all autopsy exams has been recommended (Froede,
2003). However, in practice, this recommendation has not
been widely adopted. This event demonstrates why these recommendations should be routinely implemented.
Although risk questionnaires administered to next of kin
included items meant to elucidate rabies exposure, a more
standardized approach for assessing rabies exposures among
potential organ donors is warranted. As part of continued
approaches to improve transplant safety, future efforts may
include recommending post-mortem rabies diagnosis on
CNS tissue from potential donors with unexplained encephalitis. In instances where rabies is found to be the cause of
death, all organ and tissue recipients should be considered
for PEP per published guidelines. This case highlights the
need for a more standardized approach to recognizing
organ donors with unexplained infectious encephalitis or
where rabies is considered a differential diagnosis.
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During investigation of a previous transplant-associated
cluster of rabies, rabies virus antigen was detected in high
concentrations throughout kidney tissue from one recipient, and thus in contrast to standard recommendations,
renal tissue and concentrated urine containing cellular debris were considered potentially infectious (Manning et al.,
2008; Centers for Disease C, Prevention, 2004b). In this
investigation, no evidence of rabies virus was detected in
donor kidney tissues or urine from kidney recipients, and
urine was not considered infectious. Reaching this determination, in addition to assessing exposures to urine from the
kidney recipients, increased the burden of the response in
comparison with more routine investigations following
bite-acquired rabies.
Conclusion
When faced with an urgent need to respond to this low
incidence, high-consequence disease, public health agencies
and their clinical partners acted quickly to mitigate the risk
of rabies transmission from two human rabies patients.
Specific concerns unique to this investigation included
identification and assessment of contacts following an
extended time since exposure, determination of whether
tissues and fluids not routinely considered infectious for
rabies presented a risk to contacts, management of asymptomatic recipients who had received rabies virus-infected
organs, and implementation of a single, rapid and coordinated response through the efforts of multiple distinct
jurisdictional and geographic boundaries. These challenges
were successfully met with the critical goal of ensuring
prompt and appropriate PEP administration.
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